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Abstract
This paper uses a two-period model to analyse the borrower's choice
of an optimal time pattern of mortgage payments in a world where future
house prices are uncertain. Since a decline in the value of the house can
make the borrower's equity negative, leading to default on the mortgage,
lenders in the model will require borrowers to purchase mortgage insurance,
The premimum on the insurance policy will depend on the riskiness of
mortgage, which in turn depends on the magnitude of the first of the
two mortgage payments. Mortgages _with large (small) first payments will
carry low (high) insurance premiums. Taking this fact into account
borrowers decide on the optimal riskiness of their mortgage. Borrowers
who discount the future heavily choose risky mortgages, while those who
place a higher value on future consumption opt for less risky contracts.
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Default Risk, Insurance, and the
Mortgage Contract Under Uncertainty
by
Jan K. Brueckner
The private mortgage insurance industry, which exists to protect
lenders from default losses on risky mortgages, has experienced rapid
growth since 1970. Privately insured loans rose from 5.1% of total
conventional lending in 1970 to 18.2% in 1980, with 70% of 1980 mort-
gages with loan-to-value ratios above 80% carrying private insurance.
Although growth of the private industry has made mortgage insurance
more readily accessible to borrowers, the housing finance literature
lacks an explicit treatment of the choice problem posed by the avail-
ability of insurance. The problem is a simple one: currently, the
consumer can opt for a mortgage with a low loan-to-value ratio (no
higher than 80%) and avoid the cost of insurance, or he can demand a
riskier mortgage (a 90% loan, for example) and pay the corresponding
insurance premiums. The necessity of insuring a risky mortgage makes
it costly for the consumer to enjoy the postponement of housing expenses
afforded by such a loan. However, a strong preference for present as
opposed to future consumption may make bearing the cost of insurance
worthwhile. The purpose of the present paper is to illustrate this
basic proposition in a two-period model of mortgage choice that for-
malizes the trade-off between mortgage riskiness and insurance cost.
The analysis explicitly treats the default behavior of borrowers, so
that the lender's expected loss (and hence the required insurance pre-
2
mium) can be computed for any mortgage contract. Since the model is
highly stylized, its implications are of little practical value.
However, by providing the first detailed analysis of consumer incen-
tives in mortgage markets with insurance, the paper fills a distinct
gap in the housing finance literature.
The present analysis, which is predicated on the assumption that
future house prices are uncertain, extends Brueckner's (1984) treatment
3
of the optimal mortgage problem under certainty. In a certain world,
mortgage insurance plays no role since default risk can be eliminated
via the simple requirement that mortgage payments be high enough to
avoid negative amortization. When house prices are constant or rising
over time, this requirement guarantees that the borrower's indebtedness
never rises above the value of the house, removing any incentive for
A
default. With future house prices uncertain, however, avoidance of
negative amortization will not eliminate default risk. The reason is
that a sufficiently sharp decline in prices can always make the
borrower's equity negative, creating a default incentive. With default
risk inescapable under uncertainty, lenders will require that potential
default losses be covered through insurance or some other mechanism in
order to willingly extend loans.
With the requirement of insurance, the problem of choosing an opti-
mal time path of mortgage payments assumes a different character than
in the certainty case. The key difference is that even when negative
amortization is avoided, a reduction in early payments increases the
riskiness of the mortgage and consequently the size of the required
insurance premium. As a result, the consumer bears a cost in post-
poning his housing expenses that is not present in a world of certainty.
-3-
To begin the analysis of the impact of insurance, the next section of
the paper introduces the basic two-period model and analyzes the opti-
mal mortgage under certainty. As well as generating results analogous
to those of Brueckner (1984) for a discrete-time model, the certainty
analysis provides a benchmark for the subsequent discussion. Section 3
adds uncertainty to the basic framework and considers the optimal
mortgage problem under several different scenarios. Section 4 offers
conclusions.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is important to note the
relationship between the present work and earlier papers dealing with
the economics of collateral. Barro (1976), Benjamin (1978), Harris
(1978), and Smith (1980, 1982) recognize the importance of the initial
loan-to-value ratio in determining the probability of default when
future asset value is random. However, rather than compensating the
lender for default risk by insurance, compensation occurs via the
contract interest rate in their models. A risky loan will require a
high interest rate to be attractive to the lender. While this approach
may help explain the general level of mortgage interest rates in the
economy, it is not realistic when applied to individual mortgage con-
tracts. For example, borrowers desiring relatively risky 90 percent
loans are not quoted a higher interest rate in the existing market but
rather are offered another avenue (i.e., insurance) for satisfying the
lender's default concerns. Although the net result in both cases is
to raise the level of house payments, the two approaches are concep-
tually and analytically distinct. By analysing the insurance approach
to the problem of default risk, the present paper complements the
other literature.
2. The 3asic Framework and the Certainty Solution
In the model, consumers live for two periods, denoted zero and one.
At the beginning of each period, income is received and housing costs
are incurred. Income not spent on housing is saved until the end of
the period, when purchases of a composite non-housing commodity are
made. If the consumer still owns his house at the end of period one,
the house is sold and the proceeds are used for non-housing consumption
(there is no bequest motive in the model). The artifice of introducing
a temporal distinction between the beginning and end of a period, which
follows Schwab (1982), increases the versatility of a simple two-period
framework.
In order to focus on issues of interest, housing consumption is
fixed exogenous ly in the analysis. The purchase price of the fixed-
size house is equal to v in period zero and is assumed to remain at v
in period one under certainty (under uncertainty, the period-one price
is random). In both cases, general inflation is absent in that the
price of the non-housing commodity remains constant over time at a value
of unity. The mortgage payments in the two periods are denoted m_ and
m , and these payments must satisfy
m
Q
+ m /(1+r) = v, (1)
where r is the one-period interest rate. Since the time pattern of
mortgage payments is chosen by the consumer in the model, no down
payment requirement is imposed (any down payment is simply part of nu).
Letting y and y denote incomes in the two periods and recalling that
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incorae net of housing costs is saved until the end of each period,
non-housing consumption equals
c
o
~ (y "mo )(1+r) (2)
in period zero and
c = (y
1
-m
1
)(l+r) + v (3)
in period one for a consumer who holds his mortgage to maturity (recall
that the house is sold at the end of period one in this case). It
should be noted in (2) and (3) that the option of interperiod (as
opposed to intraperiod) saving has been denied to the consumer (under
this option, c
n
would be reduced by a savings terra w , with c in-
creased by (l+r)w
f)
). The reason is that such saving has no effect on
the optimal mortgage under the utility function assumption imposed
below. Unsecured borrowing against future income, which would involve
a negative w„ , is also ruled out (the reason, of course, is that the
lender has no recourse in the event of default on such a loan).
A consumer who terminates his mortgage at the beginning of period
one is assumed to enter the rental market, where the fixed-size house
commands a rent of R per period. Under the assumption that houses
CO
last forever, R must satisfy v = S R(l+r) , or R = rv/(l+r). When the
i=0
mortgage is terminated, the consumer follows one of two courses of
action. If equity at the beginning of period one is positive, sale
of the house and settlement of the mortgage is the mode of termination.
When equity is negative, however, mortgage termination will occur via
default (the house is abandoned without penalty to the consumer in this
-6-
case). Since equity at the beginning of period one is equal to the
value of the house minus the balance due on the mortgage, or v-m
,
period-one consumption in the event that the mortgage is terminated
equals
{ y;L
- rv/(l+r) + max[v-m ,0]}(l+r) (4)
(the second terra represents the rental payment). Note that the con-
sumer enjoys positive proceeds from mortgage termination when equity is
positive but escapes full repayment of his debt under default. Note
also that in contrast to (3), (4) does not include a term representing
proceeds from an end-of-period house sale.
The next step is to determine under what circumstances mortgage
termination will occur. Termination is a desirable course of action
for the consumer when the period-one consumption level given by (4)
exceeds period-one consumption without termination, given by (3).
Subtracting (3) from (4) yields
{max[v-mlf 0] - (v-n^)} ( 1+r)
.
(5)
When v-m >_ 0, (5) equals zero, indicating that a mortgage termination
involving sale of the house results in the same level of non-housing
consumption as holding the mortgage to maturity. When v-m.. < 0,
however, (5) reduces to (l+r)(m -v) > 0, so that termination (which in
this case involves default) yields a higher consumption level.
The preceding discussion establishes the natural proposition that
the borrower will default in period one when equity is negative.
Since the lender loses money in the event of default (his loss equals
-7-
(m -v)/(l+r) in present value terras when foreclosure costs are zero),
the mortgage contract will be structured to prevent its occurrence.
In particular, the mortgage payment stream must satisfy m <^ v, or
equivalently ul.
_> rv/(l+r), using (1). The latter inequality states
that the first mortgage payment must at least cover interest on the
original loan balance (this requirement was referred to as the
"default risk, constraint" in Brueckner (1984)). When the default risk
constraint is satisfied, default will never occur in a world of cer-
tainty.
The last step in the treatment of the certainty case is analysis of
the optimal mortgage contract from the consumer's point of view.
Although this is easily done using a general utility function, the
analysis of the uncertainty case in Section 3 is intractable without a
strong assumption on the form of the function. The present analysis
will proceed under this assumption, which requires that the utility
function has the risk-neutral form u(c
n
,c.) = c~ + c./(l+9), where the
c are non-housing consumption levels in the two periods and 8 > is
the subjective discount rate. Note that since housing consumption is
fixed, it need not appear in the utility function. Substituting (2)
and (3) into the above function and eliminating nu using (1), utility
equals
U+r)<yo ri/U«» - Si^Sl , + |=| ^ (6)
The consumer's problem is to maximize this expression by choice of
m. subject to the constraint hl. <^ v. The solution is immediate:
when 9 > r, the optimal mortgage has ra.. = v and nu = rv/(l+r) (the
mortgage is a 100% loan with interest only paid in period zero); when
9 < r, a mortgage with a = and m. = v is optimal (note that the
house is actually purchased outright); when 9 = r, all feasible
9
mortgages are equally attractive. The intuition behind these results
is straightforward. When 9 is high, the future is lowly valued and it
is optimal to skew consumption toward period zero via the highest
possible itl . When 9 is low, future consumption is highly valued and
it is optimal to pay for the house entirely in period zero, allowing
the largest possible non-housing consumption in period one.
With the certainty solution as a benchmark, the analysis now turns
to the uncertainty case, where default risk is pervasive and mortgage
insurance plays a key role.
3. The Mortgage Contract under Uncertainty
The analysis of uncertainty will proceed under three alternative
sets of assumptions. Section 3.1 considers the simplest possible
model, where uncertainty over the period-one house value is added to
the basic framework of Section 2. Use of the linear utility function
makes the results of this analysis similar to those of the certainty
case, with one of two corner solutions being optimal. The subsequent
discussion shows that interior optima are possible under modified ver-
sions of the model. Section 3.2 investigates the case where the
lender incurs a foreclosure cost under default, and Section 3.3
explores the effect of the assumption that mortgage interest is tax
deductible. As well as demonstrating the existence of interior solu-
tions, the analysis in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 gives additional insight
into the structure of the model.
-9-
3.1 Uncertainty in the Simplest Model
Under uncertainty, the period-one house value is a random variable
v rather than a fixed quantity. The expected value of v is assumed to
equal v, the period-zero house value, and v's density function f(v) is
assumed to be dif f erentiable, single-peaked, and symmetric. The mini-
mum and maximum house values are denoted a and b, respectively (the
assumption b > (l+r)v is imposed to avoid inessential complications).
While the expected value assumption is not used directly in the analysis,
it guarantees that housing investors earn zero expected profits (see
footnote 15 below). The symmetry assumption on f implies that the
mode of v (the value at the peak of f) equals v, the expected value,
a fact that will prove useful in the analysis.
As shown in Section 2, mortgage default will occur when the period-
one house value is less than m, . The probability of default is there-
mi
. .
fore the probability that v is less than m
, or J f(v)dv. Note that
a a
since this integral equals -/ f(v)dv = when m.. < a, it gives the
m
l
correct default probability (zero) even in the case where m.. lies
below the range of possible house values. When default occurs, the
lender's loss in present value terras is (m -v)/(l+r), and the expected
present value of the loss is given by
* = ^ /
1 (m
1
- v)fdv (7)
a
(note that (7) equals zero for m <^ a)
.
In a competitive mortgage market, the prospect of earning an
expected present value of profit equal to zero will induce the
(risk-neutral) lender to offer any given mortgage. This means that to
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secure a mortgage with a particular value of m
1
, the borrower must make
an up-front payment to the lender equal to his expected loss, given by
x in (7). Equivalently, the borrower can purchase a mortgage insurance
policy that guarantees full compensation to the lender in the event of
default. The premium on such a policy is given by (7). Note that
since losses are fully covered under all possible mortgages, the
default risk constraint of Section 2 plays no role. A borrower is
free to choose an m
1
greater than v provided he pays the appropriate
insurance premium. Note also that since
1=7 "£^ (8)
1 a
from (7), the insurance premium increases with m.. when m, > a at a
rate proportional to the default probability. The reason, of course,
is that a higher ra makes the mortgage riskier, with higher expected
losses.
With the risk-neutral utility function introduced in Section 2,
expected utility under uncertainty is equal to
b - -
(y -m -x)(l+r) +— / [(y^m^l+r) + v] fdv
m
l
m
^ /
1
[y
1
- rv/(l+r)](l+r)fdv. (9)
Note that for v < m
,
period-one consumption reflects the occurrence of
default (consumption equals (1+r) times income less rent, which is
random since house value is ), while for v > m, , the consumption term
indicates that the mortgage is -held to maturity. When v = m, , of
course, the two consumption terms are equal. Note also that period-
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zero consumption is reduced by the amount of the mortgage insurance
premium.
The objective function of the borrower is derived by substituting
the insurance premium from (7) into the utility expression (9) while
using (1) to eliminate m
n
. After simplifying and gathering terms, the
resulting expression reduces to
fl-r "T " b
+
f+f [J vfdv
+ m
! / fdv l> ( 10 )
a m,
where ft represents the first two terms in (6). Note that the
expression in brackets in (10) is the expected period-one return to
the lender. Differentiating (10) with respect to m yields
Since (11) is positive when 9 > r, (10) is increasing in m, and the
borrower chooses the riskiest possible mortgage, setting m.. = (l+r)v
(the largest possible value) and nu = 0. Note that when 9 > r, maxi-
mizing utility requires maximizing the lender's expected period-one
return. When 9 < r, (11) is negative and a totally riskless mortgage
(with m 0, m = v, and x = 0) is optimal. In this case, maximizing
utility means minimizing the lender's expected period-one return.
Finally, when 9 = r, the optimal mortgage is indeterminate.
These outcomes are ultimately due to the same incentives as those
at work in the certainty case: a high (low) value of 9 means that future
consumption is lowly (highly) valued, causing the consumer to skew his
consumption toward period zero (one) through the mortgage contract.
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The similarity of outcomes, however, masks an important difference in
the incentive structures of the two problems, namely that a higher
m
1
carries the penalty of a higher insurance premium in the uncer-
tainty model. Since this penalty reinforces the consumer's desire to
minimize ra in the case where future consumption is highly valued
(9 < r) , the outcome m = is understandable. What is not obvious a
priori, however, is that in the case where future consumption is lowly
valued (9 > r) , the premium penalty is not sufficient to deter the con-
sumer from securing the highest possible period-zero consumption via the
riskiest possible mortgage. In the next section, it will be shown that
the presence of foreclosure costs increases the magnitude of the
insurance premium sufficiently to temper the consumer's desire to post-
pone his housing costs, leading to an interior solution to the optirai-
12
zation problem in the case where 9 > r.
Before considering the model with foreclosure costs, it will be
helpful the illustrate the results of this section diagrammatically.
In Figure 1, the heavy upward sloping curve illustrates the borrower's
opportunity locus, which shows the relationship between the required
insurance premium and m
1
. The locus is strictly convex over its
13
positive range. The indifference curves of the consumer are linear
for ra.. < a and strictly convex above a. When 9 > r, the curves are
upward sloping and always steeper than the opporunity locus. When
9 < r, the curves are downward sloping for ra, < a, although their slope
may increase sufficiently above a so that they slope up for large
14
values of m. . Lower indifference curves have higher utility levels.
Figure 1 shows families of indifference curves for the two cases, along
with the corresponding optimal (m.. ,x) pairs.
-13-
3.2 The Model with Foreclosure Costs
Foreclosure is in reality a costly process involving significant
administrative and legal expenses on the part of the lender. To
incorporate such expenses in the model, the lender is assumed to bear
a cost of s > in the event of default. Since the lender will
require that mortgage insurance cover this additional loss, the pre-
mium becomes
x =
1 r
m
l
- j
x
(s + m
1
- v)fdv, (12)1+
a
an expression that exceeds the earlier premium (7). Substituting (1)
and (12) into (9) to derive the borrower's objective function with
foreclosure costs yields
b
ft + f+f U
X
vfdv + m
1 j fdvj - s / ^dv, (13)
m
l
Note that (13) is identical to (10) except for the presence of the last
term, which equals minus the expected foreclosure cost. The deriva-
tive of (13) with respect to m.
^ s
gf/^-sfC^). (14)
When 9 < r, (14) is negative, implying that the optimal mortgage has
m = 0, as in the model of Section 3.1. When 9 > r, however, (14) may
equal zero for some interior value of m . Whether such a solution
represents the global optimum depends on satisfacton of the second-
order condition. Differentiating (14), concavity of the objective
function requires
:
f(m,) - sfHm,) < 0. (15)
1+9 1 1' -
-14-
Condition (15) is satisfied as an equality for m, [ a (where f = f = 0)
and as a strict inequality for a < m. <_ v since f > and f* > hold
in this range (recall that v is the mode of f). Since the density
slopes downhill beyond v, however, (15) need not hold for m
1
between v
and (l+r)v. In order to avoid the complications introduced by this
possibility, the following discussion will assume that (15) is
s-atisfied as a strict inequality for all m, between a and (l+r)v. Note
that when f slopes gently near its peak, so that f is never far from
zero, this assumption will be especially likely to hold.
With (15) satisfied, location of the optimum is straightforward.
If (14) equals zero at some interior m.. , that solution represents the
global optimum. If no interior solution exists, then the corner
solution m. = (l+r)v is optimal. To find the circumstances leading
to an interior solution, note first that for m.
_< a, (14) equals the
positive quantity (9-r)/(l+9), ruling out a corner solution with m. =
1 c
or an interior solution in the interval (0,a]. As m.. rises above
b
a, f(m.) rises above zero and / fdv falls below unity, leading to a
m
ldecline in (14). Using Figure 2, which shows a graph of the density
function f, it is possible to derive a simple inequality which insures
that this decline is sufficiently rapid to reduce (14) to zero before
ra. reaches v, guaranteeing the existence of an interior optimum below
v. The inequality comes from noting in Figure 2 that the area of the
box with its corner at the peak of f is unambiguously greater than the
b -
shaded area under f to the right of v. In other words, vf(v) > / fdv.
v
Note, however, that if s satisfies (l+9)s/(9-r)
_> v, then
b
(l+9)sf (v)/(9-r) > / fdv will also hold. But this last inequality
v
-15-
means that (L4) evaluated at v is negative, implying that the
expression equals zero somewhere below v. A sufficient condition for
existence of an interior optimum below v is therefore
s
_> (8-r)v/(l+9). (15)
Thus, if the foreclosure cost exceeds some fraction of the period-zero
house value (note (8-r)/(l+9) < 1), it will be optimal for the borrower
to modify the extreme behavior of Section 3.1, choosing a mortgage of
moderate instead of maximal riskiness.
Eq. (15) overstates the magnitude of s required for an interior
solution by a wide margin. The minimal requirement for an interior
optimum is simply that (14) evaluated at m. = (l+r)v is negative, which
translates into the condition
9-r b
s >-?— [/ fdv/f((l+r)v)]. (16)1+9 (l+r)v
Inspection of Figure 2 shows that the ratio of the integral to the
height of the density in (16) will typically be much less than v,
implying that condition (16) is less stringent than (15). When s fails
to satisfy this weaker condition, the increment to the insurance
premium resulting from foreclosure costs is not sufficient to moderate the
consumer's desire to postpone his housing costs, and a corner solution
involving the riskiest possible mortgage is once again optimal.
Figure 3 illustrates an interior optimum. Indifference curves have
the same slope and curvature as before, while the opportunity locus is
steeper. The opportunity locus is strictly convex between a and v,
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although its curvature between v and (L+r)v is ambiguous (the diagram
shows convexity in this range).
The value of m at an interior optimum depends on the levels of the
parameters s, 8, and r. The nature of this dependence is summarized by
the following comparative static derivatives, which are derived by
totally differentiating (14):
8m,
~ - Af(m.) < (17)dS 1
^=-^l h f^>0 (18)
m
l
3ra b -
_1 =
_A_J fdv<0 (19)
m
l
(A is the reciprocal of the negative expression in (15)). Eq. (17)
shows that by increasing the magnitude of the insurance premium, and
hence the penalty associated with a risky mortgage, an increase in s
reduces the mortgage's optimal riskiness, lowering ra, and x and raising
ra„. Eq. (18) shows that by reducing the value of already lowly-valued
future consumption, an increase in makes a greater transfer of
purchasing power toward period zero optimal, raising m
1
and x and
reducing ny*. An increase in r alters the trade-offs perceived by both
the lender and borrower (the slopes of both the indifference curves and
opportunity locus fall). The net effect is to reduce m. , as shown in
(19) (x falls and m_ increases).
As an additional comparative static exercise, it is interesting to
derive the effect on the optimal m, of a shift in the distribution of
period-one house values. Rewriting f(v) as f(v-a), where a is a shift
-17-
parameter, a shape-preserving rightward shift of the density function
corresponds to an increase in a. Noting in (14) that the upper limit
of integration must be replaced by b+a, total differentiation yields
.
20
the comparative static derivative
3m
1
~- 1, (20)da
indicating that a rightward shift in the density raises ra by exactly
the amount of the shift. The reason for this result is that the shift
in f makes any given mortgage less risky, reducing x and enticing the
consumer to increase ra.. .
Finally, it is interesting to consider a solution to the optimiza-
tion problem based on a particular form for the density f. When f is
uniform on the interval (v - e, v + e), so that f(v) = l/2e in this
21
range, (14) yields
m
1
= v + e -
-gq: s, (21)
indicating that ra.. equals the maximum house value minus a multiple
22
of s. While the above comparative static results can be verified
by direct calculation, (21) yields the additional implication that
incre<
23,24
m. rises as the variance of the uniform distribution eases (as e
rises). This does not appear to be a general result.'
3.3 The Model with Interest Deductibility
The previous section showed that when default imposes a resource
cost on the lender, the solution to the optimization problem may involve
a mortgage of intermediate riskiness requiring a moderate insurance
-18-
preraiura. When Che assumption Chat mortgage interest is tax deductible
is added to the basic framework, of Section 3.1, an interior solution
may emerge for somewhat different reasons. Under this modification,
the borrower becomes concerned with generating a large interest deduc-
tion, and a particular trade-off assumes a key role. The trade-off is
a result of the fact that while a risky mortgage generates a large
deduction as a result of its low nu., the likelihood of default (which
results in loss of the deduction) is also high. These opposing effects
cause the borrower to gravitate toward a mortgage of intermediate
riskiness, drawing him away from the corner solutions of Section 3.1.
In order to illustrate this point most clearly, the analysis will first
consider the case where 9 = r, in which the optimal mortgage was pre-
viously indeterminate.
Under the assumption that the income tax rate is a constant t >
25
and Chat interest income is nontaxable, taxes in the two periods are
t(y -I.), i = 0,1, where the I represent raorCgage interest. Since
mortgage interest is equal to the balance due on the mortgage times
the factor r/(l+r), it follows that IQ = rv/(l+r) and I, = rm,/(l+r).
Repeating the argument of Section 2, mortgage defaulc in the present
model occurs when v < m - tl. (since the interest deduction is lost
when default occurs, v must be below m by at least the amount of the
deduction for default to be desirable). Substituting for I., default
, l+(l-t)r
_ , , s s i\requires v < —— m. = 6ra
1
(note 5 < 1; .
The mortgage insurance premium now becomes
6m -
x = j^ J i (m1 - v)fdv (22)
a
and expected utility is given by
-19-
((l-t)y + crv/(l+r) - x - n^Xl+r) ' (23)
b
5 in
+
itg / {[(l"t)y 1 - 5m1 ](l+r) + v}fdv
5m
+
i^e f
Kl-t)
y;L
- rv/(l+r)](l+r)fdv
a
(note that period-one consumption without default is
(l-t)y - m + trra /(1+r) = (l-t)y - 5m ). Substituting (1) and (22)
into (23) and simplifying, the borrower's objective function becomes
(l-t)(l+r)(y + y /(W» - (l-t)r+e(l+(l-t)r) „
a 5 m..
Setting 9 = r to consider the simplest case, the last two terms of (24)
reduce to
trm, b
irr/ fdv. (25)
5 m
Since (25) equals the expected period-one interest deduction (the
magnitude of the deduction times the probability of no default), the
borrower's goal in maximizing utility is simply to choose m. to maxi-
mize the expected deduction. The trade-off noted above is clear in
(25): a higher m, increases the deduction but, by shrinking the value
of integral, reduces the probability that it will be enjoyed.
The first-order condition for maximizing (25) reduces to
b
/ fdv - 5m f(5m ) = 0. (26)
5m,
-20-
Using the previous diagrammatic argument based on Figure 2, the LHS of
(26) will be negative for 6m. = v. Therefore, (26) is guaranteed to
have a solution below m. = v/5 = (l+r)v/(l+( l-t)r) < (l+r)v. When the
objective function is strictly concave in the relevant range, this
interior solution will represent the global optimum. Thus, the
desire to maximize the expected interest deduction causes the consumer
to choose a mortgage of intermediate riskiness, with m. below (l+r)v
and nu above zero. Recall that in the absence of interest deduc-
tibility, the borrower was indifferent to the features of the mortgage
27
contract in the 9 = r case.
A similar effect emerges when 9 * r. Differentiating (24), the
first-order condition for a utility maximum is
9
^Q
tr
/ fdv
-|^ 6m1 f(6m1 ) - 0. (27)
5 m.
When 9 > r, a solution to (27) satisfying m < (l+r)v may exist and
28
represent the optimum (subject to the usual qualifications).
Interest deductibility may therefore draw a borrower with 9 > r (who
preferred the riskiest possible mortgage in Section 3.1) toward a
mortgage of intermediate riskiness. What is noteworthy about (27),
however, is that a borrower who found a riskless mortgage optimal
before (someone with 9 > r) may now prefer a risky contract. This
follows because the first term in (27) is positive (and an interior
solution is possible) as long as 9 > (l-t)r. As a result, borrowers
with 9's satisfying (l-t)r < 9 < r, who previously chose mortgages with
m. = 0, may now find a positive value of m. optimal. Thus, mortgage
-21-
interest deductibility draws borrowers away from both corner solutions
29 30
of Section 3.1 as they adopt contracts with high expected deductions. '
4. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the consumer's choice of an optimal
mortgage contract in the face of a market trade-off between mortgage
riskiness and the cost of insurance. The analysis in effect offers a
theory of the "demand" for mortgage insurance, with borrower time pref-
erences playing a key role. The theory shows that consumers who place
a low value on future consumption demand risky mortgages and hence
large insurance policies, while borrowers who value the future more
highly opt for less risky mortgages carrying low insurance premiums.
The risk-neutral utility function used in the analysis led, of course,
to rather extreme forms of such behavior, with borrowers choosing
either riskless or maximally risky mortgages in the basic model of
Section 3.1. The subsequent analysis showed, however, that mortgages
of intermediate riskiness (and moderate demands for insurance) can be
optimal when modifications such as foreclosure costs or interest
deductibility are added to the model.
An important goal for future research would be to construct a model
of mortgage insurance based on a more realistic portrayal of the con-
sumer's incentive to default on a mortgage contract. While the
paper's assumption that default is costless to the borrower can be
modified by introducing an exogenous default cost (see footnote 23),
this is an inadequate way of capturing the powerful incentives against
default that exist in the real world. Since these incentives mainly
hinge on impairment of future borrowing power, a formal treatment
-22-
would require extension of the borrower's time horizon beyond a simple
two-period framework. Construction of such a model would no doubt
provide important additional insights.
in.
(l+r)v
FIGURE 1.
f(v)
FIGURE 2,
m.
(l+r)v
FIGURE 3.
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Footnotes
These data are taken from Swan (1982).
2
Vandell (1978) and Campbell and Dietrich (1982) present empirical
evidence on the determinants of mortgage default.
3
Aim and Follain (1984) present a related simulation analysis
investigating consumer response to graduated payment mortgages and
other alternative mortgage instruments.
4
For a consumer who places a high value on present consumption,
Brueckner (1984) showed that the optimal mortgage payment stream con-
sists of two segments. Over the early part of the loan's life,
payments are constant over time and cover interest only. The second
segment has rising payments covering both interest and principal. This
time pattern of payments allows the consumer to delay his housing costs
as long as possible without exposing the lender to the risk of default.
Since these models involve a single loan repayment, the time
profile of payments is not an issue.
Smith (1980) briefly considers mortgage insurance as a means of
compensation.
An equivalent assumption is that the consumer purchases outright a
new house that is sold at the end of the period (see footnote 8).
When a new house is purchased outright instead of rented (see
footnote 7), period-one consumption is (yi - v + max[v-mi,0] )(l+r) + v,
an expression that reduces to (4).
9
It can be shown that utility level under the optimal mortgage is
at least as high as that afforded by continuous renting, a relationship
that also holds under uncertainty.
In actual mortgage markets, insurance is not required when the
loan-to-value ratio is 80 percent or less. It is interesting to note
that in order for this outcome to emerge in the present stylized
model, the mi associated with an 80 percent conventional loan must be
exactly equal to a, the minimum house value (referring to (7), mi = a
gives x = 0). Using this fact, it is possible to calculate what the
minimum house value must be in order for lenders to offer 80 percent
loans without insurance. Since the constant principal and interest
payment p under a conventional 80 percent mortgage must satisfy
p + p/(l+r) = .8v, it follows that mi - p = .8(l+r)v/(2+r) (note that
mQ = .2v + p). The requirement mi = a therefore implies that the
-24-
period one house value is expected to be no smaller than 40 percent of
v (note (l+r)/(2+r) = .5). While the lack of realism of the model
means that this conclusion cannot be taken seriously, the calculation
is nevertheless instructive.
The implicit assumption that house values are equal to the
capitalized value of current rents requires myopic expectations on the
part of investors.
12
Strictly speaking, it is the increase in the slope of the rela-
tionship between x and ra^ (see Fig. 1 below), rather than the increase
in its level, that leads to the interior solution.
13
From (8), the second derivative is f(m )/(l+r) _> 0.
14
From (9), the slope of the indifference curves is
irl/^Mv |S / b fMl+r lJ 1+9
a m
and the second-derivative is
f(m
1
)/(l+9) > 0.
In the model of Section 2, easy calculations show that housing
investors earn zero profit, regardless of whether they are self-
financing or use mortgage finance. While self-financing also yields
zero expected profit in the uncertainty case as long as the expected
value of v equals v, it is important to verify that mortgage-based
housing investment similarly earns zero expected profit under this
assumption. The first step is to note that the default rule for a
housing investor is identical to the one derived for consumers
(period-one default occurs when equity is negative). This follows
because period-one profit is (rv/(l+r)-mi)(l+r) + v when the mortgage
is held to maturity and (max[v-mi,0] )(l+r) otherwise. Using this
result and noting that period-zero profit is (rv/(l+r)-mo-x)(l+r) , the
expected present value of profit equals rv + Ev - (l+r)mo - nq_, where
E denotes expected value. Under the maintained assumption Ev = v,
this expression equals zero.
Note that since f is assumed to be dif ferentiable everywhere, f
must be continuous at a (so that f(a) = 0) and f'(a) = must hold.
-25-
A useful interpretation of the first-order condition comes from
rewriting (14) as
f(V 9-r
b - (n-e)s'
/ fdv\
which says that ra^ is optimal when the relative rate of decline of the
no-default probability is proportional to the reciprocal of the fore-
closure cost.
18
When f(a) > 0, (14) is discontinuous at ra^ = a. If the
expression is negative at this point, a mortgage with q = a Is optimal
19
From (12), the slope of the opportunity locus is
^[J X fdv + sf(m1 )]
a
and the second derivative is
f(m
x
) + sf'(m
1
)
1+r
20
Differentiating the modified eq. (14) with respect to a yields
b+a
f~[f(b) - / f'(v-a)dv] + sf'd^-a) =
m
l
A ~ b+Ct|^-[f(b) - f(v-ct)| ] + sf'^-a).
m
l
Evaluating this expression and setting a = yields a result equal to
-1/A.
21
Note that the uniform distribution has no peak and does not
satisfy the smoothness requirements used in the analysis (it is
discontinuous at the maximum and minimum house values).
22
Note that when (15) holds, (21) is less than or equal to £.
Since v >^ £ must hold for the lower support of f to be positive, the
result that the interior solution is less than v when (15) holds is
verified.
-26-
A diagrammatic argument shows that when f is single-peaked, a
reduction in the variance of the distribution has an ambiguous effect
on the value of (14).
24
It may be shown that another modification similar to the intro-
duction of foreclosure costs also has the potential for yielding an
interior solution to the optimization problem. This is the assumption
that borrower bears an explicit cost k in period one when default
occurs. Under this modification, default is optimal when v < m^-k. (the
argument parallels that of Section 2). The insurance premium becomes
x =
1+r /
(m - v)fdv,
while expected utility equals (9) with m^ in the limits of integration
replaced by m^-k and k subtracted off from period-one consumption
under default. The first-order condition for utility maximization is
,-r
b
1+
- / fdv - kf(m -k) = 0,
r J 1
m, -k
1
which may have an interior solution when 9 > r.
25
Adding the assumption that interest income is taxable introduces
extra complications without essentially changing the basic insights
offered by the analysis in this section.
While the second derivative of (25), which equals
-2f (5mi)-5mif ' (Sm^) , need not be negative for Sm^ > v, we assume
negativity holds over this range.
27
This result reemerges when t = in (25).
28
The second derivative of (24), which equals
-
9
^e"
tr
f(5m
i
) " iff [f^V + 5mif ' (6mi )]
need not be negative for 6m\ > v. As before, we assume negativity
holds. No simple condition guaranteeing existence of an interior
optimum emerges in this case. The requirement is that (27) is negative
for m.. = (l+r)v.
29
While comparative static results for the general model are ambig-
uous, the intuitive result 3mi/3t > emerges in the case where 9 = r
(by making the interest deduction worth more, a higher t draws the
consumer toward a risker mortgage). Additional results for the 9 = r
case are 3mi/3r > for t < 1/2 and < 3mi/3a < 1, where a is the
density function shift parameter.
-27-
30
It is interesting to note that when the income tax is progressive
rather than proportional, the condition for default is
v < m - [T(y ) - T(
y;L
- rra /(1+r))],
where T is the tax schedule. Although the level of income has no
effect on default propensities in the models analysed in the paper, the
fact that the RHS above is decreasing in y (the derivative is
T'(y]_ - rmi/d+r)) - T'(yi), which is less than zero since T" > 0) means
that high-income borrowers have a lower default probability for any
given m]_.
-28-
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